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Trends in Hours, Balanced Growth,
and the Role of Technology in the Business Cycle 
Jordi Galí
tions, namely, that of stationarity of hours worked
per capita. First, I argue that, contrary to what is
often believed, stationarity of (per capita) hours
is not a necessary condition for those models to
generate a balanced-growth path. Second, and
perhaps most importantly, I show that the evi-
dence for the G7 economies is generally at odds
with the key equilibrium relationship that under-
lies the stationarity of hours in those models. In
fact, that evidence suggests that both margins of
labor utilization (i.e., hours per worker and the
employment rate) display some nonstationarity
features in most G7 countries.
The evidence of nonstationarity in hours per
worker points to the importance of using an hours-
based measure of productivity when estimating
the effects of technology shocks under the
approach proposed in Galí (1999), in which tech-
nology shocks are identified as the only source of
nonstationarity in labor productivity. The reason
is straightforward: Shocks unrelated to technology
that have a permanent effect on hours per worker
(but not on output per hour) would be a source of
nonstationarity in employment-based measures
1 INTRODUCTION
B
usiness cycles have long been associated
with highly procyclical fluctuations in
labor input measures. In the mind of the
common man, the recurrent ups and downs in
employment (or unemployment) observed in
modern economies are arguably more of a defin-
ing feature of the business cycle than the accom-
panying fluctuations in gross domestic product
(GDP).1 Understanding the factors underlying
the joint variation of output and labor input
measures remains a key item in macroeconomists’
research agenda.
This paper focuses on a dimension of those
joint fluctuations that is generally ignored by
macroeconomists, in theoretical as well as in
empirical analysis: the long-run behavior of hours
worked. In particular, the paper revisits a property
common to the majority of intertemporal equi-
librium models used in macroeconomic applica-
This paper revisits a property embedded in most dynamic macroeconomic models: the stationarity
of hours worked. First, the author argues that, contrary to what is often believed, there are many
reasons why hours could be nonstationary in those models, while preserving the property of
balanced growth. Second, the author shows that the postwar evidence for most industrialized
economies is clearly at odds with the assumption of stationary hours per capita. Third, he examines
the implications of that evidence for the role of technology as a source of economic fluctuations
in the G7 countries.
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              of productivity and would thus be mislabeled as
technology shocks. I revisit here the international
evidence on the effects of technology shocks using
an hours-based measure of productivity and find
little evidence in support of a major role of tech-
nology as a source of business cycles.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the relationship between the stationarity
of hours and the balanced-growth hypothesis.
Section 3 provides some evidence on the behavior
of the two margins of labor utilization for the G7
countries and discusses the implications of that
evidence. Section 4 presents new estimates of
the effects and role of technology shocks in the
G7 countries.
2 THE STATIONARITY OF HOURS
AND THE BALANCED-GROWTH
HYPOTHESIS
Since the seminal work by Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986), most business
cycle models have adopted a neoclassical growth
framework (augmented with a consumption-
leisure choice) as a “core structure,” on which
stochastic disturbances and frictions of different
sorts are added. The choice of a specification for
preferences and technology in the resulting models
has been generally guided by the requirement
that the underlying deterministic model is con-
sistent with some “stylized facts” of growth. It is
generally argued that imposing such a require-
ment facilitates calibration of the model on the
basis of information unrelated to the business
cycle phenomena that the model seeks to explain.
Prominent among those stylized facts is the
observation that many key macroeconomic vari-
ables such as output, consumption, investment,
and the stock of physical capital display a simi-
lar average rate of growth over sufficiently long
periods of time. That property is referred to as
“balanced growth.” Another important observation
is that hours worked per capita do not display any
obvious trend that one could associate with the
secular upward trend shown by the real wage.
Third, and in contrast to the real wage, the return
to capital (as reflected, say, in the real interest rate)
does not seem to display any significant long-run
trend.
The analysis of King, Plosser, and Rebelo
(1988), among others, pointed out that the predic-
tions of the neoclassical framework can be recon-
ciled with the previous facts if (i) technology can
be represented by a constant returns production
function with labor-augmenting technical progress,
(ii) preferences display a constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, and (iii) the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and
hours (or leisure) is homogeneous of degree one
in consumption. Specifications satisfying those
properties are commonly adopted “as a discipline
device” by business cycle theorists, even when
their subject of inquiry is viewed as being unre-
lated to the forces underlying long-term growth.
Unfortunately, as I will argue, the widespread
adoption of an unnecessarily strong version of the
balanced-growth hypothesis has led to a common
misconception—namely, that stationarity of hours
worked is an inherent feature of models displaying
balanced growth.2
2.1 A Benchmark Framework with No
Frictions
To illustrate the basic point, let us first assume
a constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology,
implying the following linear expression for the
(log) marginal product of labor3:
mpnt = yt – nt,
where yt denotes output and nt is hours worked
(or “hours,” for short), both normalized by the size
of the working-age population and expressed in
logs.
Second, and in a way consistent with the
requirements derived by King, Plosser, and Rebelo
(1988), let us assume that preferences imply the
following expression for the (log) marginal rate
of substitution:
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2 Cooley and Prescott (1995), among others, provide an explicit
account of that strategy: “[W]e are going to restrict our attention
to artificial economies that display balanced growth. In balanced
growth, consumption, investment, and capital all grow at a constant
rate, while hours stay constant.”
3 Constant terms are ignored throughout the paper.mrst = ct + ϕnt,
where ct denotes the log of per capita consumption
and ϕ is the reciprocal of the Frisch labor supply
elasticity.4 Notice that normality of both consump-
tion and leisure requires that ϕ > 0.
In a benchmark real business cycle (RBC)
model with perfect competition in goods and
labor markets and no other distortions, the effi-
ciency condition mrst = mpnt holds at all times,
implying
(1)                       nt = –(1 + ϕ)–1sc,t,
where sc,t ; ct – yt is the log of the share of con-
sumption in output (henceforth, the “consump-
tion share”). The intuition behind the negative
relationship is simple: Starting from an efficient
allocation, both an increase in consumption (given
output) or a decline in output (given consumption)
make an additional unit of leisure more valuable
than the marginal use of time in productive activi-
ties, thus calling for a drop in hours to maintain
efficiency.
The “strong” version of the balanced-growth
property adopted in most macroeconomic appli-
cations requires that sc,t fluctuate about a constant
mean value sc. As a result, it must also be the case
that hours are stationary and fluctuate around a
constant mean n = –(1 + ϕ)–1sc. In the standard
RBC model (closed economy, no government),
the steady-state consumption share sc and, hence,
steady-state hours, are determined exclusively
by preference and technology parameters.
2.2 Hours Worked and the Consumption
Share: Evidence for the United States
Next I turn to the data, to provide an assess-
ment of the relationship between hours and the
consumption share displayed in (1) and implied
by the simple framework noted here previously.
I start by looking at aggregate quarterly U.S.
data.5 I use hours of all persons in the nonfarm
business sector (LXNFH), normalized by the size
of the population aged 16 or older, as a benchmark
measure of hours. As a benchmark series for the
consumption share, I use the ratio of personal
consumption expenditures in nondurable goods
and services (CN+CS) to GDP, both expressed in
current prices.6 Figure 1A displays the empirical
counterparts to nt and sc,t. While some negative
short-run comovement between the two series is
easily discernible, it is clear that the overall picture
is dominated by what looks like a common upward
trend in the second half of the sample period.
Figure 1B displays the business cycle compo-
nent of the two series, obtained by applying the
band-pass filter developed in Baxter and King
(1999) and calibrated to remove fluctuations of
periodicity outside an interval between 6 and 32
quarters. Once the low-frequency trends are dis-
pensed with, a strong negative comovement
between hours and the consumption share emerges
clearly. That relationship is consistent with two
stylized facts of business cycles—namely, the
procyclicality of hours worked and that consump-
tion is less volatile than output at business cycle
frequencies (which makes the consumption share
countercyclical).
The previous visual assessment is confirmed
by a straightforward statistical analysis. Thus, a
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of
(log) hours on the (log) consumption share yields
the following estimated equation (standard errors
in parentheses, constant term ignored):
nt = 0.16 sc,t R2 = 0.03,
(0.05)
with the simple correlation between the two
variables being 0.19. Notice that the fit of the
estimated regression equation, as measured by
the R2, is extremely low for a relationship that is
supposed to hold exactly. To make things worse,
the sign of the estimated coefficient is inconsis-
tent with the theory’s prediction.
By way of contrast, an OLS regression using
the business cycle component of both series yields
the estimated equation
Galí
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4 The assumption of a constant elasticity of the marginal rate of
substitution with respect to hours can be relaxed, but is adopted
here for convenience.
5 Quarterly U.S. data are drawn from the USECON data set. The
sample period is 1948:Q1–2003:Q4. The corresponding mnemonics
are shown in parentheses.
6 In the appendix, I show that this is the right measure if one allows
for changes in the relative price of consumption goods.nt = –1.26 sc,t R2 = 0.61,
(0.06)
with the corresponding correlation being –0.78.
Thus, and while far from displaying the exact
relationship implied by the benchmark model,
the business cycle component of hours and the
consumption share shows a very strong negative
comovement. Notice also that, strictly speaking,
the estimated coefficient on the consumption
share with an absolute value greater than 1 is
inconsistent with the theory (since it would imply
that leisure is an inferior good). Given the lack of
a structural interpretation of the error term, com-
bined with the likely distortions introduced by
the detrending filter, I do not want to put too much
emphasis on the point estimate.7 Yet, it is worth
noticing that the previous finding seems consis-
tent with the requirement stressed by RBC theo-
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Figure 1
Hours and the Consumption Share: U.S. Evidence
Nondurables and Services
7 A similar finding, albeit in the context of the estimation of a stag-
gered price setting model, is found in Sbordone (2000).rists of a high intertemporal substitution in labor
supply in order to account for the large fluctua-
tions in hours.8
2.2.1 Robustness: Alternative Measures.
Similar findings emerge when I use an alternative,
more comprehensive, measure of aggregate hours
constructed by multiplying total civilian employ-
ment (LE) by average weekly hours in manufac-
turing (LRMANUA). The same is true for meas-
ures of the consumption share constructed using
two alternative definitions of consumption,
namely, total private consumption (C)—which
includes durable goods expenditures—and total
consumption (C+GFNE+GSE)—which includes, in
addition, nondefense government consumption.
Table 1 reports the estimates of the coefficient
of an OLS regression of (log) hours on the (log)
consumption share, using all possible combina-
tions of measures of both variables, and with stan-
dard errors reported in parentheses. The second
column reports the corresponding correlations.
The third and fourth columns show analogous
statistics using the business cycle component of
each series. Interestingly, when the (unfiltered)
data are used, the regression coefficient has the
wrong sign for all specifications. When I use data
on total hours (see bottom panel), the correlation
becomes higher and significant, but always with
the wrong sign (positive). The latter just captures
the fact that both series display a common upward
trend for most of the period.
Again, when we turn to the business cycle
component, the results change dramatically: A
very strong negative comovement between hours
and the consumption share emerges for all the
specifications.
2.3 Hours Worked and the Consumption
Share: International Evidence
Next I examine the comovements of hours
and the consumption share for the G7 countries,
in order to assess the extent to which the evidence
in the previous subsection is specific to the United
States or carries over to other countries. In doing
so I use the data set on hours worked (normalized
by population aged 14 to 65) constructed by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and part of their Labor Force
Statistics data set. The data frequency is annual
and the sample period, common across countries,
starts in 1970 and ends in 2002. The graphs on the
left-hand side of Figure 2 display, for each coun-
try, the time series for hours and the share of (total)
consumption in GDP. The graphs on the right-hand
side show the growth rates of the same variables.9
That graphical evidence is supplemented with
Galí
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Table 1
Comovement of Hours and the Consumption Share: U.S. Evidence
Log-levels Business cycle component
sc ρ sc ρ
Nonfarm business hours
Nondurables and services, private 0.16 (0.05) 0.19 –1.26 (0.06) –0.78
Total private consumption 0.25 (0.06) 0.25 –1.32 (0.08) –0.71
Total consumption 0.01 (0.04) 0.04 –1.14 (0.05) –0.76
Total hours
Nondurables and service, private 0.84 (0.06) 0.66 –1.28 (0.05) –0.85
Total private consumption 1.00 (0.07) 0.68 –1.17 (0.08) –0.67
Total consumption 0.69 (0.04) 0.71 –1.13 (0.04) –0.74
8 As exemplified by the indivisible model of Hansen (1985) and
Rogerson (1988).
9 Given the annual frequency of the data, growth rates provide a
better representation of short-term fluctuations.Galí
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Figure 2
Hours and the Consumption Share: International EvidenceTable 2, which reports, for each country, the cor-
relation between the (log) consumption share and
(log) hours, in both levels and first differences.
While the patterns of both variables seen in
the figures display substantial differences across
countries, two basic common features are appar-
ent. First, neither the consumption share nor
hours per capita display any tendency to revert
to some constant mean, over the 30-year period
considered. In other words, there seems to be
prima facie evidence of some sort of nonstation-
arity in both series. Second, and as confirmed by
the correlations in Table 2, there is no evidence
of the tight negative relationship between those
variables suggested by (1). Japan is the only
country for which a strong negative correlation
can be found between the (log) levels of the two
variables.
As was the case with quarterly U.S. data, when
we turn our attention to higher-frequency changes
(as represented by first differences here), the cor-
relations become negative (with the exception of
Italy), but they are still rather low in absolute
value and far from the perfect correlation implied
by the benchmark framework above.
2.4 Interpretation
Notice that even under the baseline neoclas-
sical framework described here previously, one
can think of plausible reasons that would render
the consumption share nonstationary and that
could thus provide a potential explanation for
the nonstationarity in hours within the paradigm.
The presence of permanents shifts (or an under-
lying trend) in the share of government purchases
in GDP may be the most obvious one—one that
seems to be relevant in the case of the postwar
U.S. economy. (From the early 1950s to the late
1990s that share declined by about 5 percentage
points.) Yet, according to the benchmark neo-
classical framework, the increase in the consump-
tion share should have come hand in hand with
a reduction in hours, not an increase like the one
observed in the U.S. economy—a pattern dis-
played also by Canada and Germany—and not
with the largely disconnected long-run pattern
of hours displayed by other countries (with the
possible exception of Japan).
More generally, modern economies are subject
to a variety of frictions and distortions that can
account for permanent shifts—and, thus, unit-
root-like behavior—in hours. Furthermore, this
can occur without violating the central element
of the balanced-growth hypothesis, namely, that
over the long run the main components of aggre-
gate demand are expected to grow at the same rate
(or, in other words, their growth rates have a
common unconditional expectation).
To illustrate this point consider the following
extension of the framework above, along the lines
of Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2003). First, one
may want to allow for a possible wedge between
the marginal product of labor (which, for simplic-
ity, we keep equating to average labor productivity)
and the real wage paid by the firm per hour of
work. Letting µp
t denote that wedge, we thus have
(in logs)
(2) wt – pt = mpnt – µp
t = (yt – nt) – µp
t.
Second, a wedge may exist between the wage
and the (average) household’s marginal rate of
substitution, as a result of labor income taxes, wage
setting by unions, efficiency wages, etc.10 Formally,
and letting µw
t denote that wedge, we have
10 This is the wedge emphasized in Mulligan (2002), who provides
an analysis of its long-run behavior in the United States.
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Table 2
Comovement of Hours and the Consumption
Share: International Evidence
Correlation between n and sc
Levels First differences
United States 0.80 –0.57
Canada 0.23 –0.53
Japan –0.73 –0.49




SOURCE: Data are from the OECD Labor Force Statistics
Database and Annual National Income Accounts.(3) wt – pt = mrst + µw
t .
Finally, and as emphasized by Hall (1997),
the marginal rate of substitution may experience
stochastic shifts—some of which might be perma-
nent—both as a result of genuine shifts in indi-
vidual tastes or composition effects derived from
demographic forces. We can represent that feature
by appending a preference shock ξt to our expres-
sion for the (log) marginal rate of substitution:
(4) mrst = ct + ϕnt+ ξt.
Combining (2), (3), and (4), we obtain the fol-
lowing expression for hours:
nt = –(1 + ϕ)–1(sc,t + µp
t + µw
t + ξt).
Hence, we see that any permanent shifts in
the labor and product market wedges or in pref-
erences will result in a permanent shift in hours
worked, for any given consumption share. To the
extent that we are willing to allow for changes in
any of those variables, there is no obvious reason
(other than modeling convenience) why all those
changes should be stationary. The presence of
price and wage stickiness, with their consequent
temporary deviations in markups from their
desired levels, appears perhaps as the only “nat-
ural” source of stationarity in the fluctuations in
hours in this context. Some changes in desired
markups, on the other hand, are likely to be per-
manent (e.g., those resulting from changes in the
regulatory environment). This property may also
characterize changes in taxes that may affect the
labor market wedge.11 Needless to say, many
shifts in preferences or in the share of consump-
tion in GDP are likely to be permanent in nature.
Given the above considerations, the apparent
nonstationarity in hours and its decoupling from
the consumption share should come as no sur-
prise, despite its central role in common versions
of business cycle models.12
2.5 The Two Margins of Hours Variation:
A Look at the International Evidence
It is not the purpose of the present paper to
uncover and even less so to quantify the relative
importance of the different likely sources of nos-
tationarity in hours. Yet, a look at the two margins
of variation in hours, namely, hours per worker
and the employment rate, suggests that a simple
representative agent model will find it hard to
account for the labor market dynamics behind the
observed changes in hours. The low-frequency
changes in both margins are substantial and dis-
play patterns that vary significantly across coun-
tries. These features are illustrated in Figures 3A
through 3G, which show for each G7 country the
evolution of hours worked per capita (more pre-
cisely, per person aged 16 to 65), average hours
per worker, and the employment rate (i.e., the
ratio of employment to working-age population).
The data are drawn from the labor force statistics
data set compiled by the OECD, with the sample
periods differing somewhat across countries.
As a cursory look at the figures makes clear,
the evidence constitutes an embarrassment of
riches. Thus, for instance, the United States and
Canada display an upward trend in hours per
capita in the late part of the sample, which is the
result of a continuous increase in the employment
rate, combined with a flat pattern for hours per
worker. In the early part of the sample, on the
other hand, the relatively stable path for hours per
capita hides very different (mutually offsetting)
trends in hours per worker (downward) and the
employment rate (upward).
The remaining G7 countries have experienced
instead a secular decline in hours per capita. But,
again, the underlying composition differs across
countries. Thus, in the United Kingdom and Italy,
it is largely the result of a decline in hours per
worker, combined with a relatively stable employ-
ment rate. In Japan, hours per capita decline in
spite of a persistent upward trend in the employ-
ment rate. In France and Germany, on the other
hand, the downward trend in the employment
rate only reinforces that of hours per worker.
Galí
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11 Thus, Prescott (2004) argues that differences in labor income taxes
can account for the gap in hours worked between the United States
and Europe. Mulligan (2002) provides evidence of large and per-
sistent changes in the labor market wedge.
12 See Francis and Ramey (2002) for a similar argument using a fully
specified growth model. In their model, permanent changes in
government purchases, tax rates, or a preference parameter are
shown to have a permanent effect on steady-state hours.Galí
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Labor Force Statistics: Italy2.6 Some Implications
While a number of papers have explored the
consequences of introducing both margins of
hours variations into a dynamic business cycle
framework, I am not aware of any attempt to
enrich those models with features that could help
explain the low-frequency changes in hours per
worker and the employment rate highlighted here
previously.13 To the extent that such low-frequency
variations are due to factors orthogonal to the
business cycle phenomena that those models seek
to explain, abstracting from those features may
be the right strategy when developing business
cycle models. In particular, the secular decline
in hours per worker observed in most countries
would seem to fit that description. The same may
be true for the observed long-run trend in the
employment rate in the United States, Canada,
and Japan. In contrast, a look at the low-frequency
variation of the latter variable in the continental
European countries suggests a stronger connection
to cyclical episodes.
Most importantly, and putting aside the
implications for the theoretical modeling of 
the business cycle, the existence of such low-
frequency movements in hours is likely to impinge
on empirical analyses and characterizations of
economic fluctuations and their sources. The
controversy, described later, regarding the appro-
priate transformation of hours in the recent empiri-
cal literature on the effects of technology shocks
is a case in point. The evidence presented here
contrasts starkly with the assumption of stationar-
ity in hours found in many empirical applications
and raises some doubts about any empirical
findings that ignore the existence of those low-
frequency movements, while hinging on the
assumption of stationary hours. Furthermore, as
discussed later, the existence of a significant non-
stationary component in hours per worker implies
that employment-based measures of productivity
will be ridden with a nonstationary measurement
error, which may question the validity of analyses
that made use of those measures. That was the
case, due to lack of data availability, for the inter-
national evidence on the effects of technology
shocks reported in Galí (1999). In the next section
I revisit that evidence using data on hours and
hours-based productivity measures for the G7
countries.
3 INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON
THE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY
SHOCKS
3.1 Background
The dynamic effects of technology shocks and
their role as a source of economic fluctuations
have been the focus of growing interest among
macroeconomists.14 The bulk of the evidence
generated by that literature has pointed to effects
of technology very much at odds with the predic-
tions of the standard RBC model. In particular,
when technology shocks are identified in a struc-
tural vector autoregression (VAR) as the source
of permanent shifts in labor productivity, they
generate a negative comovement between hours
and output (see, e.g., Galí, 1999, and Francis and
Ramey, 2002). Furthermore, and not surprisingly
in light of the previous result, the implied esti-
mated contribution of technology shocks to the
variability of output and hours at business cycle
frequencies tends to be very small, an observa-
tion that contrasts with the central role assigned
to those shocks as a source of business cycles in
the RBC literature.15
In a recent paper, Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Vigfusson (2003; CEV hereafter) have pointed
out that the first finding (i.e., the negative response
of hours to a positive technology shock) may not
be robust to using an alternative VAR specifica-
tion that includes the level of (log) hours, as
opposed to detrended hours or its first difference
as a labor input measure. More specifically, when
CEV reestimate the VAR using the level of (log)
Galí
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13 A possible exception, albeit in the context of a stylized model of
wage-setting by unions/insiders with no explicit variation at the
intensive margin, is found in Blanchard and Summers (1986).
14 For a recent survey of that literature, see Galí and Rabanal (2004).
15 Similar results are obtained in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (forth-
coming) using a growth-accounting approach to construct a meas-
ure of technological change. See also the references in the Galí
and Rabanal (2004) survey.hours, they find that a positive technology shock
drives hours up, not down, and generates the posi-
tive comovement of hours and output that is the
hallmark of the business cycle.16
A recent paper by Fernald (2004) provides a
convincing explanation for the discrepancy of
the estimates of the effects of technology shocks
when hours are introduced in levels. In particular
he shows that the presence of a low-frequency
correlation between labor productivity growth
and per capita hours, while unrelated to cyclical
phenomena, distorts significantly the estimates
of the short-run responses. Fernald illustrates
that point most forcefully by reestimating the
structural VAR in its levels specification (as in
CEV), while allowing for two (statistically signifi-
cant) trend breaks in labor productivity (in the
mid-1970s and mid-1990s, respectively) and
showing that hours decline in response to a posi-
tive technology shock in the resulting estimates,
in a way consistent with the findings obtained
when the difference specification is used.
A different strategy is pursued by Francis
and Ramey (2004). Those authors construct an
alternative time series for hours, with an annual
frequency and spanning the entire 20th century.
The Francis-Ramey series normalizes total hours
worked in the business sector using a population
measure that excludes not only the population
aged 16 and less (as in CEV), but also the popula-
tion older than 65, as well as that enrolled in
school or employed by the government. The
resulting series for hours per capita is largely
devoid of any of the nonstationary features that
were apparent in the original series (as discussed
in Section 2). Most interestingly, though, when
Francis and Ramey reestimate the effects of tech-
nology shocks using the (log) level of the new
series, they recover the findings associated with
the detrended or first-differenced specification,
i.e., a positive technology shock induces a short-
run decline in hours and a negative comovement
between the latter variable and output.
3.2 New Evidence for the G7 Countries
Next I present some further evidence on the
effects of technology shocks using data for the G7
countries. Motivated by the evidence and dis-
cussion in Section 2, I treat (log) hours (as well
as labor productivity) as a difference-stationary




t and ε d
t  are serially uncorrelated, mutu-
ally orthogonal structural disturbances whose
variance is normalized to unity. The polynomial
|C(z)| is assumed to have all its roots outside the
unit circle. Estimates of the distributed lag poly-
nomials Cij(L) are obtained by a suitable transfor-
mation of the estimated reduced form VAR for
[∆xt,∆nt] after imposing the long-run identifying
restriction C12(1) = 0.17 That restriction effectively
defines {ε z
t } and {ε d
t } as shocks with and without
a permanent effect on labor productivity, respec-
tively. On the basis of some of the steady-state
restrictions shared by a broad range of macro
models, I interpret permanent shocks to produc-
tivity {εz
t } as technology shocks. On the other hand,
transitory shocks {ε d
t } can potentially capture a
variety of driving forces behind output and labor
input fluctuations that would not be expected to
have permanent effects on labor productivity. I
refer the reader to Galí (1999) and Francis and
Ramey (2002) for a detailed discussion.
A number of recent papers have provided
related evidence using data for countries other
than the United States, as surveyed in Galí and
Rabanal (2004). Here I revisit some earlier evi-
dence using international data, which the find-
ings of Section 2 might call into question. Thus,
in Galí (1999, 2004) and Francis, Owyang, and
Theodorou (2004), a similar structural VAR-based
approach is applied to G7 countries’ quarterly
data. In that exercise, Galí (1999) used both first-
differenced and detrended (log) employment as
a measure of labor input, obtaining a negative
response of employment to a positive technology
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17 See Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Galí (1999) for details.
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16 Yet, it is important to stress that their estimates of the contribution
of technology shocks to the variance of output and hours is rather
small, consistent with the findings in Galí (1999) and others.Similar qualitative results for the euro area as a
whole are found in Galí (2004), where I used the
quarterly data set for the euro area recently con-
structed by Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001), also
using employment as a measure of labor input.18
Francis, Owyang, and Theodorou (2004) used first-
differenced (log) employment, together with other
macro variables, focusing on the potential role of
monetary policy factors in shaping the response
to technology shocks.
In light of the evidence and discussion found
in Section 2, the use of employment as a measure
of labor input raises a potential problem. First, and
to the extent that hours per worker vary over time,
employment-based measures of labor productivity
will be ridden with error. Most importantly, how-
ever, the presence of a possible nonstationary
component in hours per worker undermines the
theoretical basis for the identification strategy used
in that work. In particular, it implies that factors
other than technology may generate permanent
shifts in measures of output per worker—and
hence may be incorrectly labeled as technology
shocks—even if they do not have any long-run
effect on “true” labor productivity (i.e., output
per hour). The availability of (relatively long)
homogeneous time series for hours worked in a
number of OECD countries allows one to over-
come this problem. Next I describe the evidence
on the effects of technology shocks obtained by
applying the structural VAR framework previously
noted to hours-based measures of productivity
and labor input for the G7 countries.
The top graph in the top panel of Figures 4A
through 4G displays, for each G7 country, the
growth rates of GDP and hours over the period
1970-2002. As it is clear to the eye, both series
display a strong positive comovement, which
can be viewed as one of the defining features of
the business cycle. The corresponding uncondi-
tional correlations, reported in the third column
of Table 3, range from 0.30 (Italy) to 0.84 (United
States). The second graph shows the components
of GDP and hours growth associated with tech-
nology shocks, while the third graph shows the
component driven by other (nontechnology)
sources. With the exception of the United Kingdom
and Japan, the comovement of hours and GDP
growth generated by technology shocks is much
smaller than that observed in the original data.
As shown in Table 3, that conditional correlation
is even negative in some cases (United States, Italy,
and France) and very small in others (Germany
and Canada). The first two columns of Table 3,
which show the estimated contribution of tech-
nology shocks to the variance of GDP and hours
growth, suggest a limited role of technology shocks
as a source of fluctuations in the growth rates of
either GDP or hours. In particular, technology
shocks account for more than 50 percent of the
variance of hours growth only in Italy and the
United Kingdom, though as discussed below,
this can hardly be attributed to the mechanisms
underlying RBC model.
A look at the estimated impulse responses of
labor productivity, GDP, and hours to a positive
technology shock (i.e., one that raises productiv-
ity) helps clarify the previous patterns. Those
impulse responses (together with a ± 2 standard
errors confidence interval) are shown in the bot-
tom panel of Figures 4A-4G. The sign of the point
estimate for the impact responses of GDP and
hours is also shown in Table 3. For all countries
but Japan, a positive technology shock generates
either a negligible response of hours or a short-run
decline in that variable, in contrast with the pre-
dictions of the standard RBC model. With the
exception of the United Kingdom, the corre-
sponding response of output to the same shock
is positive. It is thus not surprising that for the
remaining countries (United States, Canada,
Germany, Italy, and France) technology shocks
do not make the large contribution to the variance
of both GDP and hours growth that proponents
of the RBC paradigm would have led us to expect.
In fact, a look at Table 3 suggests that the pattern
of conditional second moments and impulse
responses that one would associate with an RBC
model that were capable of accounting for the
bulk of GDP and hours fluctuations can only be
found for Japan. Why the latter country (as well
as the United Kingdom) displays a pattern differ-
ent from the rest is beyond the scope of this paper.
18 In particular, technology shocks are found to account for only 5
percent and 9 percent of the variance of the business cycle com-
ponent of euro area employment and output, respectively, with
the corresponding correlation between their technology-driven
components being –0.67.
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Fluctuations and Their Sources
The Effects of Technology Shocks
Figure 4A
Sources of Fluctuations: United StatesGalí
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Fluctuations and Their Sources
The Effects of Technology Shocks
Figure 4B
Sources of Fluctuations: CanadaGalí
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Fluctuations and Their Sources
The Effects of Technology Shocks
Figure 4C
Sources of Fluctuations: JapanGalí
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Fluctuations and Their Sources
The Effects of Technology Shocks
Figure 4D
Sources of Fluctuations: United KingdomGalí
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Fluctuations and Their Sources
The Effects of Technology Shocks
Figure 4E
Sources of Fluctuations: GermanyGalí
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Fluctuations and Their Sources
The Effects of Technology Shocks
Figure 4F
Sources of Fluctuations: FranceGalí
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Fluctuations and Their Sources
The Effects of Technology Shocks
Figure 4G
Sources of Fluctuations: Italy4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The present paper has revisited the empirical
and theoretical grounds for a property found in
most dynamic macroeconomic models—namely,
that of stationarity of hours worked per capita.
From a theoretical viewpoint, I have argued that
stationarity of hours per capita is not a neces-
sary condition for a macro model to generate a
balanced-growth path. One can think of many
factors that could lead to nonstationary hours,
including permanent shifts in government pur-
chases or in labor and product market wedges,
as well as permanent preference shifts. In fact,
it is hard to imagine why some of those factors
would remain unchanged or display only transi-
tory fluctuations.
From an empirical perspective, I have shown
that the evidence for most industrialized econ-
omies appears to be at odds with the equilibrium
relationships that are at the root of the property
of stationarity in hours per capita. In fact, that
evidence suggests that both margins of labor uti-
lization (i.e., hours per worker and the employ-
ment rate) display some nonstationarity features
in most countries.
Finally, I have revisited the international evi-
dence on the effects of technology shocks using
a measure of output per hour for the G7 countries.
That measure overcomes the potential identifica-
tion problems that may have resulted from using
an employment-based measure of productivity,
given the evidence of significant nonstationarity
in hours per worker. The findings from that exer-
cise suggest that, possibly with the exception of
Japan, the evidence on the effects of technology
shocks shows major discrepancies with the pre-
dictions of standard real business cycle models.
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HOURS WORKED AND THE CONSUMPTION SHARE IN A TWO-
SECTOR MODEL
The first-order condition of the household problem is
wt – pc
t = ct + ϕnt,
where pc
t denotes the price of consumption goods.










A weighted average of the previous conditions implies
wt – pt = yt – nt,
which, combined with the expression derived above, yields
(pt + yt) = (pc
t + ct) + (1 + ϕ) nt.
Letting sc,t ; (pc
t + ct) – (pt + yt) denote the (log) ratio of nominal consumption to nominal output
and rearranging terms yields equation (1) in the text. 
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